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IRS	defines	“substantial	business	activities”	as	25%	of	the	“expanded	affiliated	group’s”	employees,	assets,	and	gross	income.3	Because	of	this	rule,	second	wave	inversions	involve	mergers	with	foreign	targets	that	satisfy	the	25%	test.	However,	75%	of	the	combined	entity	can	be	the	old	US	multinational,	and	the	headquarters	invariably	remain	in	the	US.		In	fact,	both	Pfizer/Allergan	and	the	failed	Mylan/Perrigo	takeover	(the	two	most	recent	high	profile	deals)	involve	mergers	of	two	US	companies	that	are	only	nominally	foreign	(Allergan	and	Perrigo	are	“Irish”	and	Mylan	is	“Dutch”	but	substantively	they	are	all	American).	The	first	wave	of	inversions	was	done	for	two	reasons:	First,	since	new	foreign	parent	was	not	a	CFC	(as	a	publicly	traded	entity	it	did	not	have	any	10%	US	shareholders,	even	if	all	the	shareholders	were	US	persons),	it	(and	any	of	its	foreign	subsidiaries)	could	avoid	Subpart	F	restrictions	on	the	receipt	of	passive	income	and	base	company	income.	Second,	New	foreign	parent	could	engage	in	earning	stripping	transactions	with	old	US	parent,	in	which	up	to	50%	of	old	US	parent’s	income	could	be	“stripped”	through	interest	deductions	on	loans	from	new	foreign	parent	(in	the	case	of	royalties,	100%	stripping	is	theoretically	possible	since	the	earnings	stripping	limits	of	IRC	163(j)	only	apply	to	interest).	In	the	second	wave,	a	third	reason	was	added:	Since	most	US	multinationals	now	have	large	amounts	of	income	that	is	“trapped”	in	their	CFCs	and	cannot	be	brought	back	because	of	the	35%	tax	on	dividends	(including	deemed	dividends	under	IRC	956),	post-inversion	structures	were	devised	in	which	the	CFCs	lent	or	distributed	their	earnings	to	new	foreign	parent,	which	could	then	use	it	to	buy	back	its	shares	or	distribute	dividends.	Such	“hopscotch”	transactions	(bypassing	old	US	parent)	were	targeted	by	the	Treasury	in	Notice	2014-52,	which	recharacterizes	them	as	deemed	dividends	to	old	US	parent	under	IRC	956.	The	policy	response	to	inversions	depends	to	a	significant	extent	on	which	of	these	three	reasons	drives	the	inversion.	If	the	main	driver	for	inversions	is	Subpart	F,	the	solution	could	be	to	relax	the	Subpart	F	rules	(e.g.,	by	abolishing	the	base	company	rule).	But	there	is	no	evidence	that	recent	inversions	are	driven	by	this	reason.	When	the	first	wave	of	inversions	began	Subpart	F	still	had	real	teeth,	as	indicated	by	the	NFTC’s	1999	plea	to	relax	its	limitations.	Check	the	box	(and	its	currently	defunct	but	soon	to	be	extended	legislative	companion	IRC	954(c)(6))	did	away	with	this	problem,	and	other	than	956,	US	multinationals	no	longer	have	a	problem	with	Subpart	F	(as	indicated	by	their	ability	to	accumulate	$2	trillion	in	low	tax	jurisdictions	offshore	in	a	way	that	Stanley	Surrey,	the	architect	of	Subpart	F,	would	have	found	abhorrent).	If	the	main	driver	for	inversions	is	accessing	trapped	earnings,	the	solution	is	(arguably)	territoriality.	But	it	is	unlikely	that	this	is	the	main	problem,	because	(a)	hopscotch	transactions	were	targeted	by	Notice	2014-52,	but	inversions	continue																																																									3	Treas	Reg	1.7874-3	(finalized	June	3,	2015).	
2
Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 120 [2015]
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/120














Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2015
